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Abstract: 
For several decades the leading wind energy nations were European, while China and India 
were mainly the recipients of technology transfer. This has been challenged in recent years 
with the strong growth of wind energy capacity and technological capabilities in China and 
India. This paper aims to explore the role technology transfer and technology cooperation 
from Europe played in shaping leading firm-level wind energy technologies in China and 
India and to discuss whether the recent technology cooperation between Chinese, Indian 
and European wind energy firms challenges the classical North-South technology 
cooperation paradigm. This paper draws on fieldwork in China, India and Europe, including 
qualitative interviews with about 70 experts from (wind) energy firms, business associations, 
research organisations and government authorities. The research finds that firm-level 
technology transfer and cooperation shaped the leading wind energy technologies in China, 
such as Goldwind’s permanent magnetic direct drive turbines, and to a lesser extent in India. 
In addition, the paper finds that several trends towards South-North technology cooperation 
have been observed between China, India and Europe, such as South-North flows of capital, 
South-North drivers for market access, South-North R&D leadership, while the origins of 
innovation (e.g. patents) seem to remain predominantly in the global North. The paper 
concludes that the technology cooperation between China, India and Europe has become 
more mutual, multi-facetted and increasingly Southern-led. 
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Highlights:  
 In the past Chinese & Indian wind technology was partly derived from EU wind firms. 
 Today China and India challenge the North-South technology cooperation paradigm. 
 Chinese & Indian wind energy firms drive global flows of capital and market access. 
 Chinese & Indian wind energy firms show South-North R&D leadership.  
 Still the origins of innovation tend to remain predominantly in the global North. 
 
1. Introduction  
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Technology transfer and technology cooperation are key mechanisms for transferring low 
carbon innovation1, such as wind energy technology, from high income countries to low and 
middle income countries. Many scholars within innovation literature have looked at 
innovation from a nation state perspective. Scholars such as Hu (1992), Porter, (1990) and 
Patel (1995) state that the national systems of innovation are important in driving forward 
innovation. The technology transfer and cooperation debate is still embedded in a nation 
state context where technology and knowledge are predominantly perceived as being 
passed on from developed countries to developing countries. 
For at least three decades, China and India have been the recipients of transferred wind 
energy technology from the European Union (EU) countries (Lema and Lema, 2012; Mallet 
et al., 2009). This followed the classical North-South technology transfer model involving 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Overseas Development Aid (ODA) or domestic investments 
for foreign-acquired technologies. The focus on the nation state and its role for technology 
transfer and cooperation has led to some limitations in the dominant debate. The role of 
firms for technology transfer has received less attention in the literature. At the same time, 
national innovation systems are being more and more challenged by increased globalization. 
Ohmae argues that the nation state has lost importance through globalization and hints at 
new global actors playing more important roles in diffusing innovation (Ohmae, 1990).  
Wind energy markets, firms and technology have evolved over the years and firms have 
become increasingly important. Today, China is the world’s largest wind energy market and 
four of its biggest wind energy firms, Goldwind, Sinovel, Guodian United Power and 
Mingyang, are part of the global top 10. Today, India is the world’s fourth largest wind energy 
market and its leading wind energy firm, Suzlon, is part of the global top 10. At the same 
time, European wind energy markets and European technology have become 
internationalised due to the entry of big wind energy firms from emerging economies that 
have licenced technology, set up joint ventures, acquired and merged with European wind 
energy firms.  
The theory of international technology transfer and cooperation has been discussed for at 
least two decades (Bell, 1990; Able-Thomas, 1996) and while climate change has increased 
the need and urgency for low carbon technology transfer (Hedger McKenzie et al., 2000; 
Brewer, 2008; Ockwell and Mallett, 2012), few fundamental changes have been witnessed in 
the understanding and dynamic of technology transfer. At the same time, a separate strand 
of literature highlights the global implications of the rise of China and India (Kaplinsky and 
Messner, 2008; Humphrey and Messner, 2006) and discusses how production capabilities 
                                                             
1
 Low carbon innovation is here defined as innovation of technology that has lower carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gas emissions than conventional fossil fuel technology. Wind energy technology 
has zero greenhouse gas emissions from its electricity generation and very low emissions from its 
construction, transport and waste phases, compared to fossil fuels. Wind energy technology is one of 
the leading low carbon technologies due to its world-wide commercial diffusion, its technological 
maturity and its competitive prices.  Both traditional wind mills and modern wind energy turbines have 
been used long before climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy became public 
concerns. They were promoted to enable decentralised electricity production, increase energy 
security and help overcome peak oil. While wind energy technology is a phenomenon in itself, it could 
potentially provide lessons for other low carbon energy technologies, such as solar energy and 
hydropower technology. 
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have been rapidly growing in these countries, while innovation capabilities are still lagging 
behind. Awate et al. (2012; 2014) shed light on the catch-up strategies of emerging economy 
multinationals and conclude this is fundamentally different to the firm strategies of advanced 
economy multinationals, including in the wind energy industry. This has also influenced the 
thinking on technology transfer and cooperation, albeit only slowly. Current literature 
highlights how historically Asian and European wind firms were engaged in different forms of 
technology transfer and technology cooperation and how Asian wind firms are increasingly 
catching up (e.g. Lewis, 2013; Gosens and Lu, 2013; Lema and Lema, 2013; Lema and 
Lema, 2012; Schmitz and Lema, 2013; Dai et al., 2014). Some literature also mentions how 
more recently Chinese, India and European wind energy firms are engaged in a complex set 
of technology cooperations (e.g. Schmitz and Lema, 2013; Lema and Lema, 2012). 
The above mentioned literature is highly relevant for this paper; however it provides little 
discussion about how the dominant paradigm of North-South technology transfer and 
cooperation is challenged by the emerging economies of China and India. This paper fills a 
gap by examining how a new form of South-North technology cooperation for wind energy 
technology from China and India to the EU is changing the common understanding of 
technology transfer and cooperation. 
The paper examines specific firm-level case studies as outlined in table 1.  
Table 1: Overview of the case studies. 
China case study 1: Goldwind India case study 1: Suzlon 
Vensys –Goldwind REpower – Suzlon 
China case study 2: Other firms India case study 2: Other firms 
Fuhrländer and Aerodyn – Sinovel, Guodian 
United Power and Mingyang 
Enercon – WindWorld India 
Vensys - ReGen 
The research questions for this paper are:  
What role does technology transfer and technology cooperation from the EU play in shaping  
leading firm-level wind energy technologies in China and India, particularly from market 
leaders Goldwind and Suzlon, but also Sinovel, Guodian United Power, Mingyang, 
Windworld India and ReGen?  
Does the recent rise of Chinese and Indian wind energy firms and their technology 
cooperation with European wind energy firms challenge the classical North-South 
technology cooperation paradigm? 
Our research finds there has been a departure from the classical technology transfer and 
cooperation model: emerging economies being formerly at the receiving end of technology 
transfer and cooperation are today leaders in technology cooperation with high income 
countries. This has led to a new form of South-North technology cooperation, where 
emerging economies’ capital, their firms’ hunger for European markets and their flexibility to 
jointly adapt advanced technology for their purposes are driving the cooperation. The 
question around the origins of innovation, such as who develops patents and other forms of 
intellectual property rights (IPR), is also being challenged by Chinese and Indian wind firms. 
This could be seen as a form of ‘reverse’ technology cooperation from emerging economies 
in the global South, like China and India, to the global North. This has implications for the 
common understanding of the technology transfer and cooperation paradigm and it requires 
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further investigating the sources of funding, access to markets and technology and the 
origins of innovation for fully understanding this new form of technology cooperation. This 
also means that technology cooperation between emerging economies and high income 
countries in the global North has become more mutual, multi-facetted and complex as the 
power and financial balance have shifted, while the innovative capabilities may be acquired 
through joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions. 
Section 2 elaborates the material and methods. Section 3 presents the theoretical approach 
of the paper and an overview of wind energy in the EU and in China and India. Section 4 
presents the empirical findings and examines issues of international technology transfer and 
cooperation for wind energy between the EU and China and India using the case studies. 
Section 5 discusses the findings and section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Material and methods 
The paper is based on results from in-depths interviews conducted in China, India, EU 
(particularly Germany and Denmark) from 2011 to 2013, as well as firm strategy analysis, 
literature review and policy analysis. 
The paper uses case studies to explore how and to what extent technology transfer and 
technology cooperation from the EU have shaped the leading firm-level wind energy 
technologies of China and India today. The case study approach is based on Yin (2009); the 
analytical approach used is cross-case synthesis. China, India and the EU are analysed and 
systematically compared as they are three large, important wind energy markets whose 
approach to wind energy innovation and technological development differs significantly. 
The firm-level technologies we examine in this paper for China are from the firms Vensys – 
Goldwind (DE/China), as well as from several smaller German firms such as Fuhrländer and 
Aerodyn that helped shape leading Chinese firm-level wind energy technologies at Sinovel, 
Mingyang and United Power (DE/China). The firm-level wind energy technologies we 
examine in this paper for India are from REpower - Suzlon (DE/India), Enercon - Windworld 
(DE/India) and Vensys – ReGen (DE/India). 
This fieldwork involved in-depth qualitative interviews with almost 70 experts from (wind) 
energy firms, business associations, research organisations and government in the EU (with 
a focus on Germany and Denmark), China and India. The interviewees were selected based 
on their leading positions in their organisations and their expertise in relation to the 
Germany, Danish, Chinese and Indian wind energy industry. A full list of interviewed 
organizations can be found in the footnote2.  
                                                             
2
 Representatives from the following organisations were included in the interviews: AREVA (wind 
energy firm), BMU (German Ministry for the Environment), Bosch Rexroth (component supplier firm), 
BTM Consult (wind energy consultants), CEwind (research organisation), Danish Energy Association 
(business association), Danish Energy Authority (DEA, Ministry of Environment), Danish Wind Design 
(wind energy firm), Danish Wind Energy Association (DWIA, business association), Dong Energy 
(energy firm), DTU/Risø Research Centre on Renewable Energy (research organisation),  Enercon 
(wind energy firm), Envision (wind energy firm), EWE (energy firm), ForWind (research organisation), 
Greenpeace (NGO), Institute for Ecological Economics Research IOEW (research organisation), LM 
Wind Power (wind energy firm), Mita-Teknik (component supplier firm), Norwin (wind energy firm), 
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The interview questions were semi-structured, qualitative questions. The interviews were 
conducted in the local languages and then translated into English. Information which is not 
referenced in this paper is derived from the interviews. Additional data on the wind energy 
industry comes from organisations such as the Chinese Wind Energy Association, the 
Danish Wind Energy Association, the German Wind Energy Association, the Indian Wind 
Energy Association, the European Wind Energy Association EWEA, the Global Wind Energy 
Council GWEC and the International Energy Agency IEA. 
 
3. Theory 
3.1 Conceptual framework and theory  
The paper draws mainly on the theories of international technology transfer and cooperation 
for low carbon innovation to explain how the transfer of low carbon technology has been 
fundamental in providing access to wind energy innovation in emerging economies such as 
China and India. The paper focuses primarily on private sector initiatives and firm-specific 
issues. First, the paper discusses what is meant with innovation and then technology 
transfer and cooperation is being discussed. 
Innovation is here defined as creating something new, developing a new product, service or 
idea (Rogers, 2003). Technological development and innovation can follow different 
directions, here referred to as innovation paths. For the wind industry, the key relevant 
innovation actors are 1. wind turbine manufacturers and component manufacturers; 2. 
research and development (R&D) bureaus based at firms, universities and research 
institutes; 3. Electric utility firms that manufacture (part of) wind turbines. Other important 
actors are banks and credit institutions that invest in the wind industry. In the EU and India, 
these actors usually come from the private sector (e.g. wind turbine firms) unless they are 
public institutions like universities and research institutes. In China some leading wind firms 
and utilities are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Urban and Nordensvard (2015) conclude 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
REpower (wind energy firm), Vattenfall (energy firm), VDMA Power Systems (business association), 
Vensys (wind energy firm), Vestas (wind energy firm), Windar Photonics (component supplier), 
Tsinghua University (research organisation), Bloomberg Energy (business research organisation), 
Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology MOST, Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection 
MEP, NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission), Goldwind (wind energy firm), Sinovel 
(wind energy firm), Guodian United Power (wind energy firm), Mingyang (wind energy firm), Dongfang 
(wind energy firm), Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy MNRE, Indian Ministry of Power, 
Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency IREDA, Indian Central Electricity Authority CEA, 
ReGen Powertech (wind energy firm), Suzlon (wind energy firm), RRB Energy (wind energy firm), GE 
Energy (wind energy firm), Green Infra (energy firm), Centre for Wind Energy Technology (research 
organisation), World Institute of Sustainable Energy (research organisation), Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance (business research organisation), Prayas (NGO). Several interviewees came from the same 
organization, sometimes from their bases in different countries (e.g. Vestas in Denmark, Germany, 
India). The interviews were conducted by the authors in 2011, 2012 and 2013 at various sites in 
Germany, Denmark, China and India. 
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that public actors and state funding play a key role for wind energy innovation in China; 
which differs considerably from the EU and India. 
Innovation paths are defined as pathways that technological innovation follows from R&D to 
commercialisation and diffusion (Dosi, 1982). Changes in innovation paths can depend on 
various factors like firm strategies, market strategies, competition, previous innovation 
(Porter, 1990). Innovation involves production capabilities and innovation capabilities. In 
many sectors, developed countries are leading in terms of innovation capabilities, while 
developing countries tend to rely more on production capabilities. However, this is changing 
in emerging economies. In the specific case of China and India, Altenburg et al. (2008) 
suggest that China and India may be transitioning from production powers to innovation 
powers in the long-term.  
To increase access to low carbon energy technology, such as wind energy technology, in 
low and middle income countries such as China and India, Brewer (2007) refers to the need 
for a facilitation of innovation and diffusion through international technology transfer –North-
South, South-North and South-South- under the ‘technology transfer paradigm’. The IPCC’s 
Special Report on Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer defines 
‘technology transfer’ as a ‘broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, 
experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change [...] The broad and 
inclusive term "transfer" encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology cooperation 
across and within countries. It comprises the process of learning to understand, utilise and 
replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to local conditions 
and integrate it with indigenous technologies’ (Hedger McKenzie et al.., 2000:1.4). This 
definition thus includes both technology transfer and technology cooperation. Experience 
has shown that the understanding of technology transfer and cooperation has broadened in 
recent years, moving away from pure ‘hardware-thinking’ to embed two distinct flows: 1 a 
flow of equipment as well as know-how and experience for operating, managing and 
maintaining the equipment from one firm or country to another, 2 a flow of technology- and 
business-related information from one firm or country to another such as through joint 
ventures and other forms of technology cooperation. 
International technology cooperation refers to a wide range of cooperative approaches 
between firms and/or countries, including technology transfer through FDI and ODA, joint 
ventures, licencing agreements, mergers and acquisitions. This paper does not focus on 
ODA as it was more important for the early stages of the wind energy industry in China and 
India, such as in the 1980s and early 1990s. This paper analyses what happened in recent 
years with regards to technology cooperation between Europe, China and India.  
International technology transfer usually requires the passing on of hardware and/or skills 
and experience to the recipient firm or country, often involving FDI or ODA. Joint venture 
refers to an internal form of technology cooperation with two or more firms working together 
on developing a technology. Licencing means that the technology from one firm or country is 
being sold and/or a licence is issued to another firm for the use of the technology. Mergers 
refer to the merging of two or more firms into one firm, whereas acquisitions refer to one firm 
buying another firm. In all of these cases hardware and sometimes software and IPR are 
transferred or shared with a recipient firm or country. International technology cooperation 
can be formal, such as through formal agreements and Memorandums of Understanding, or 
informal, such as through personnel movement, publications, conferences, network 
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discussions (Pietrobelli, 2000) or a mixture (Ockwell and Mallett, 2013). It can also be of 
commercial nature, such as joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions, or it can be non-
commercial, such as through development aid or scientific exchanges (Able-Thomas, 1996; 
Ockwell and Mallett, 2013).  
The commercialised European advanced wind energy technology had its origins in the 
1970s and 1980s, with Denmark starting local manufacturing of wind turbines in the late 
1970s, Germany in the early 1980s, followed by other EU countries such as Spain. India 
started local manufacturing of wind turbines in the mid-1990s and China in the late 1990s 
(Lewis, 2013). There is a history of technology transfer and cooperation, first in the form of 
foreign aid, later in the form of joint ventures, licencing and acquisitions between European 
and Chinese and Indian wind energy firms. This will be elaborated in section 4 by using case 
studies. Finding localised, innovative wind energy models is still a priority for climate change 
mitigation today (Chen et al., 2011).  
‘Reverse’ South-North technology cooperation is here defined as technology cooperation 
that is driven by emerging economies in the global South, hence countries that were formerly 
at the receiving end of technology transfer and cooperation, but are today leaders in 
technology cooperation with high income countries. This involves four factors: 1. the capital 
for the technology cooperation comes from emerging economies (a reverse flow of capital 
from South to North), potentially influencing ownership of the firm and strategic decisions; 2. 
overseas market access is driven by firms from emerging economies, potentially opening up 
access to new markets; 3. technologies are jointly being amended between firms from 
emerging economies and high income countries, potentially leading to innovative designs 
and technologies that are more appropriate for the new markets; 4. the origins of innovation 
(such as patents and other IPRs) come from emerging economies. Amending technologies 
jointly (see factor 3) can, but must not lead to formally registering the amended technology 
as a patent or another form of IPR (see factor 4) and it does not indicate who/which firm 
holds the ownership of the IPR (see factor 4). Not all four factors of South-North technology 
cooperation have to be equally strongly developed. See table 2. Common forms of this type 
of technology cooperation are joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions. This paper questions 
whether ‘reverse’ technology cooperation has happened in wind energy technology 
cooperation between China, India and the EU (see the discussion in section 4).  The notion 
of markets and suppliers has to be further unpacked: Southern markets can be supplied by 
(a) Northern suppliers (traditional flow of technology); (b) suppliers in their own countries 
(import substitution mode); or (c) suppliers from other Southern countries. Northern markets 
can be supplied by (a) domestic suppliers (b) suppliers from other Northern countries; or (c) 
suppliers from Southern countries. In the past, Northern wind energy markets have mainly 
been supplied by Northern suppliers, while Southern wind energy markets have to a large 
extent been supplied by Northern suppliers too and increasingly domestic suppliers. This 
research suggests that these supply strategies in Northern and Southern markets have 
shifted to some extent, with Chinese and Indian suppliers operating in European markets 
and contributing to the internationalization of global wind markets. 
Table 2: Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-North technology cooperation 
Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-
North technology cooperation 
Description 
South-North flow of capital The capital for the technology cooperation 
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comes from emerging economies (a reverse 
flow of capital from South to North), 
potentially influencing ownership of the firm 
and strategic decisions. 
South-North drivers for market access Overseas market access is driven by firms 
from emerging economies, potentially 
opening up access to new markets. 
South-North joint R&D / R&D leadership Technologies are jointly being amended 
between firms from emerging economies and 
high income countries, potentially leading to 
innovative designs and technologies that are 
more appropriate for new markets. 
South-North origins of innovation  The origins of innovation (such as patents 
and other IPRs) come from emerging 
economies. 
Based on the conceptual framing above, the paper is based on two hypotheses: 
The first hypothesis of this paper is that technology transfer and technology cooperation from 
the EU has contributed to shaping specific firm-level wind energy technologies in China and 
India. To some extent this has influenced their innovation paths.  
The second hypothesis is that the recent rise of Chinese and Indian wind energy firms and 
their cooperation with European wind energy firms challenges the classical North-South 
technology cooperation model and leads to the emergence of South-North technology 
cooperation between Asia and the EU.  
These issues will be elaborated in detail in sections 4 and 5.  
 
3.2 Wind energy in the EU, China and India  
 
3.2.1 Key trends and characteristics in the EU  
The EU 28 had a total installed capacity of more than 117 GW in early 2014 (GWEC, 2014). 
Germany currently has the largest installed wind capacity in the EU, namely about 30% of 
the EU’s total, followed by Spain with about 20%. Other leaders in wind energy in the EU are 
Spain, the UK, Italy, France, and Denmark (ranked according to the size of their wind 
markets) (GWEC, 2014; IEA, 2014). Today wind energy accounts for about 7% of the EU’s 
electricity consumption (GWEC, 2014).  
Germany is currently Europe’s largest wind energy market and the world’s third largest wind 
energy market after China and the US with an installed capacity of more than 34 GW in early 
2014 (GWEC, 2014). Germany’s wind energy market has been growing continuously since 
the mid-1990s (BWE, 2012; IEA, 2013). The market shares of wind firms in Germany are as 
follows: about 60% Enercon, 20% Vestas, 10% REpower, 4% Nordex, 2% Bard, remaining 
4%: others, including e.n.o., Vensys, Siemens and AREVA (Lema et al., 2014; Nordensvard 
and Urban, 2015).  
German wind energy innovation is characterised by high-quality, high-cost, large wind 
turbines predominantly using the Direct Drive in place of gears and mainly operating 
onshore, although offshore developments are increasing rapidly. In terms of deployment, the 
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wind energy industry in Germany is historically located onshore, with Enercon as the 
stronghold of the German wind energy developers and their innovation. The offshore 
industry has just recently begun to grow, but is currently booming. Onshore wind technology 
in Germany is very advanced and has nearly reached the technical limit for energy 
efficiencies, according to wind energy experts.  
With regard to core technology, turbine sizes rank in the multi-megawatt segment. Enercon’s 
E-126 was the world’s largest wind turbine for many years with a nameplate capacity of 7.58 
MW, until Danish Vestas developed the V164 8MW turbine. Research for even larger 
turbines in the range of 10 MW is currently ongoing. For offshore, wind technology still needs 
more development with regard to grid access and grid extension issues, installation of 
turbines, transport, (floating) fundaments, business models and materials (Urban and 
Nordensvärd, 2015; Lema et al., 2014). A key characteristic of the German wind energy 
technology is the Direct Drive, which has been developed by Enercon’s Aloys Wobben in the 
early 1990s. The market leader Enercon uses an electro-magnetic Direct Drive, while 
Vensys uses a Permanent Magnetic Direct Drive. Other firms, such as Siemens, have also 
recently switched from gears to the Direct Drive (Nordensvard and Urban, 2015). 
Other leading wind energy markets in the EU are Spain, home of one of the world’s top wind 
energy firms Gamesa, as well as Denmark. Denmark has been one of the world leaders in 
wind turbine technology since the 1970s, thanks to its leading firm Vestas. 
Denmark is the geographic home to two main wind energy firms, namely Vestas and 
Siemens (which is a German firm, but has its main production facilities in Denmark), as well 
as some component suppliers and utility firms. Danish wind energy innovation is 
characterised by high-quality, high-cost, large wind turbines predominantly using gears and 
operating both offshore and onshore, with offshore having more potential these days. With 
regard to core technology, turbine sizes rank in the multi-megawatt segment, with Vestas 
new V164 8MW offshore turbine being currently the world’s largest turbine. Research for 
even larger turbines in the range of 10 MW is currently ongoing. Danish wind firms, and 
particularly Vestas, are predominantly using turbines with gears. The gear technology has 
been perfected by Vestas, although it is increasingly facing competition by turbines with 
Direct Drives (Lema et al., 2014). 
 
3.2.2 Key trends and characteristics in China 
 
China is currently the world’s largest wind energy market. None of the world’s top 10 wind 
energy firms were Chinese a decade ago. However, after the implementation of Kyoto 
Protocol in 2003, Chinese wind industry experienced a quick growth both in terms of 
manufacturing capacity and installed capacity along with the expansion of the international 
wind market (Urban et al., 2012). As we will discuss in section 4, this was mainly due to 
technology transfer and technology cooperation with European wind energy firms. 
China had an installed capacity of more than 91 GW in early 2014 (GWEA, 2014). The five 
largest wind energy firms are currently Goldwind (about 20%), Sinovel (about 17%), United 
Power (about 16%), Mingyang Wind Power (about 6%), and Dongfang (about 5%) (Li et al., 
2013). 
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In terms of deployment, China adopted a large-scale wind farm strategy nationwide. More 
than 20 provinces have large wind energy projects under construction (Li et al., 2013).  
Compared to its European counterparts, Chinese wind energy innovation is characterised by 
lower cost, varying quality that ranges from low to high depending on specific turbines and 
firms, medium to large wind turbines using both gears and Direct Drives and operating 
mainly onshore, although some offshore wind farms exist. Many turbines are in the medium 
segment of 1.5 to 2.5 MW. 
In terms of core technology, China makes great technology improvements with R&D 
activities pushed by the government, technology imports, cooperative innovation and 
indigenous innovation. For example, Goldwind gained the PMDD through collaborative 
research and joint efforts with a joint venture with Vensys from Germany. 
 
3.2.3 Key trends and characteristics in India 
India is currently the fifth largest wind energy market in the world. It had an installed capacity 
of more than 20 GW in early 2014 (GWEA, 2014). Wind energy technology developed in 
India thanks to a wind energy programme initiated by the Department for Non-Conventional 
Energy Sources in 1983, which was supported by funders such as the World Bank and 
Danish International Development Agency DANIDA.  
Leading wind energy firms in India are Suzlon (about 20%), Windworld India (about 20%), 
ReGen (about 15%) Gamesa (about 15%), General Electric (GE) (about 15%), and Vestas 
(about 10%) (GWEA, 2014).  
Compared to its European counterparts, Indian wind energy innovation is characterised by 
lower cost (although more expensive than Chinese turbines), varying quality that ranges 
from adequate to high depending on specific turbines and firms, quality, medium to large 
wind turbines using both gears and Direct Drives and operating onshore, with no offshore 
wind farms at the moment. 
In terms of core technology, Indian wind turbine manufacturers are moving increasingly 
towards multi-megawatt turbines to be installed at greater heights. In the last half decade, 
the average size of wind turbine generators has increased from 767 kW to 1.2 MW (Narain 
et al., 2014). This shift in size has led to better infrastructure and has improved the overall 
bankability of wind power projects by reducing the cost per unit of electricity produced. Both 
turbines with gears and Direct Drive exist, with gear-driven turbines being the traditional 
model and the Direct Drive becoming more popular due to Enercon entering India (and now 
being Windworld India) as well as ReGen, which is a spin-off of German firm Vensys.  
 
4 Results 
 
4.1 Empirical findings: International technology transfer and cooperation for wind 
energy between the EU, China and India 
This section presents and analyses the empirical case study material (sections 4.2 and 4.3).  
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This paper presents an analysis of case studies based on the type of technology cooperation 
between Europe and China/India. It does not focus on technological capabilities of Chinese 
and Indian firms as this goes beyond the scope of this paper. With regards to technological 
capabilities, Zhou et al. (2015) reveal a mixed picture. In recent years the number of basic 
patents for Chinese and Indian lead firms Goldwind, Mingyang and Suzlon has been 
increasing rapidly. They have now about 200-350 basic patents, which are comparable to 
Enercon and Siemens. Vestas is however the outlier and has far more patents. The situation 
is different for patent families, where Suzlon scores very high, along with Enercon and 
Vestas (again scoring highest), while Siemens, Goldwind and Mingyang lag behind (Zhou et 
al., 2015). In gerenal, Chinese and Indian lead firms lag behind regarding SCI paper 
publications, although Enercon has very few publications too. See table 3 for details. Zhou et 
al. (2015) conclude that in particular Chinese firms are weak in knowledge outflow, but 
demonstrate strong learning capacities (inflow), mainly based on technology cooperation as 
will be elaborated in this paper. Lead firm Goldwind has rapidly increased its number of 
patents since the acquisition of German firm Vensys. From a technological capability 
perspective, Indian lead firm Suzlon benefits from the acquisition of German firm REpower 
(Zhou et al., 2015), which again will be elaborated in the case studies below. 
Table 3: Overview of technological capabilities for European, Chinese and Indian lead firms. 
Amended from Zhou et al., 2015. 
 Goldwind Mingyang Suzlon Enercon Vestas Siemens 
Patents 
(basic, by 
2012) 
231 200 314 337 1061 294 
Patents 
(family, by 
2012) 
233 228 1772 4826 5093 453 
SCI papers 
(by 2012) 
2 0 14 3 105 156 
Ownership 
by country  
China China India Germany Denmark Germany 
The next sections will present the firm-level case studies for technology cooperation 
between Europe and China/India. 
 
4.2 Case study China 
The role of the Chinese wind energy industry for climate change mitigation has been 
analysed for some time (e.g. Lema and Ruby, 2006; Urban et al., 2012). Schmitz and Lema 
(2014) argue that there is a relationship between 26 Chinese turbine manufacturers and 18 
(mainly) European knowledge-intensive businesses, most of which are German.  
Table 4 indicates the relationship between Chinese wind energy firms and European wind 
energy firms with regards to different models of technology transfer and technology 
cooperation. Interesting to note is that the 4 top Chinese wind firms (indicated in cursive in 
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the table below) have all build their wind energy expertise on technology transfer from 
European, mostly German, wind energy firms: Goldwind has conducted joint development 
with Vensys as well as licensing from Jacobs/REpower, Guodian United has licensed 
technology from Aerodyn, Mingyang had joint development with Aerodyn and Sinovel 
licensed technology from Fuhrländer. 
Table 4: The relationship between Chinese and European wind energy firms with regards to 
different models of technology transfer and technology cooperation. Lead firms are indicated 
in italics. Source: Amended from Lewis, 2013. 
Chinese company Model of technology 
transfer / cooperation 
European source firm 
A-Power (GaoKe) License Fuhrländer  
 License / joint development Norwin 
Beijing Beizhong License DeWind  
CSIC Haizhuang License Frisia 
 Joint development Aerodyn 
DEC License REpower 
 Joint development Aerodyn 
Goldwind License Jacobs/REpower 
 Joint venture / acquisition Vensys 
Guodian United Power License Aerodyn 
Harbin Stream Turbine Co. License Aerodyn 
Hewind Joint development Aerodyn 
Huide License Fuhrländer 
Jiuhe License Windrad Engineering 
Mingyang Joint development Aerodyn 
REpower North Joint venture REpower 
Sewind License DeWind 
 Joint development Aerodyn 
Sinovel License Fuhrländer 
Windey License REpower 
Xi’an Aero Engine Corp. Joint venture Nordex 
Xi’an – Nordex Joint venture Nordex 
Yinhe Avantis Joint development Avantis Energy 
This paper focuses specifically on two case studies: 1. market leader Goldwind and its 
relationship to Vensys, 2. other leading firms: Fuhrländer – Sinovel, Aerodyn – Guodian 
United Power and Mingyang. See the sections below. 
 
4.2.1 Technology cooperation in Europe and China: Vensys - Goldwind  
Vensys 
Vensys is a German wind turbine manufacturer that was acquired by the Chinese firm 
Goldwind in 2008. Vensys started as a small engineering bureau that emerged from an R&D 
centre at the University of Saarbrücken. Vensys has been commercially operating in 
Germany since 2000, whereas the R&D activities at the university started about 10 years 
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earlier. Vensys was acquired by the Chinese wind firm Goldwind with a share of 70% in 
2008. Vensys operates via licensing in China (Goldwind), India (ReGen Powertech), Brazil 
(Enerwind/IMPSA wind) and Spain (EOZEN). It has strict rules for licensing to ensure that its 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) are protected. It sells its turbines in Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, China, Germany, India, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Romania and the 
United States. Goldwind provided Vensys with access to the Chinese market and contacts; it 
enabled the small firm to up-scale rapidly and to supply a huge market. Goldwind has 
access to Vensys’ profits, technology, IPRs, its components and markets. Vensys is famous 
for developing the Permanent Magnet Direct Drive (PMDD) which is a technology based on 
a permanent magnet that powers the drive, hence different from the electromagnetic Direct 
Drive Enercon uses. The acquisition of Vensys by Goldwind has contributed to the 
internationalization of EU wind markets and technology. German and Chinese technology 
cooperation has led to joint R&D and joint technology. Vensys’ PMDD technology requires 
the use of rare earths. The PMDD fits very well for production in China since China is one of 
the few countries that has access to rare earths resources, whereas other countries – such 
as Germany – struggle to access rare earths.(Urban and Nordensvärd, 2012; Lema et al., 
2013). It sells medium to large turbines and is currently conducting R&D for a 10MW turbine. 
Goldwind  
Goldwind was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in Xinjiang. As one of the earliest wind 
energy firms in China, it evolved in many parts of the wind energy business, including wind 
turbine design and manufacturing, wind resource assessment, and wind farm operation. In 
recent years, Goldwind has become the largest manufacturer of wind turbines in China and 
the 2nd largest globally (CIEDS, 2013). It has a market share of about 20% and is said to 
have installed a generating capacity of about 3600 MW (Li et al., 2013). With strong, 
internationalized R&D capabilities, Goldwind has become the world’s largest manufacturer of 
PMDD wind turbines. For now, Goldwind has its branches and factories located in six 
continents.  
Goldwind experienced several key innovation paths along its development. Goldwind started 
the development and marketing of 600kw and 750kW in the 1980’s, leading the Chinese 
wind market. The early turbines installed in China relied on imported components from 
technology transfer. Already in 1989, the predecessor of Goldwind, China XWEC, licensed 
wind energy technology from German wind firm Jacobs Energie. China’s first five turbines 
installed in 1998 had only about 33 percent local content. In 2001, Jacobs Energie merged 
with another company to form the REpower Systems Group. That same year, Goldwind 
obtained a license from REpower for a 750 kW turbine. In both cases, Goldwind insisted to 
add technician and researcher training in the contract. While Chinese engineers were sent to 
Germany for operational training, experts from Jacobs and REpower also went to China to 
work and provide on-site training. Through the immersion of design teams and experimental 
learning processes, Goldwind improved its innovation capacity and successfully produced 
turbines of 600 kW and 750 kW in 1999 and 2001, respectively. This forms the bases for 
later joint research of the 1.2 MW turbine with Vensys. 
In 2003, Goldwind embarked on the collaborative design of a 1.2MW PMDD wind turbines 
with Vensys. Unlike REpower, Vensys was a design firm who therefore was complementary 
to a manufacturer like Goldwind. However, Vensys only designed gearless turbine 
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technology (direct drive gearless wind turbine), which was uncommon back then and is 
different from Goldwind’s previous innovation paths -- Goldwind produced turbines with 
gears, namely doubly fed induction generators of 600kW and 750kW before. Advantages in 
the new innovation path meant that gearless turbines had less weight, less cost, less parts 
for maintenance and replacement. When considering the strategic potential, Goldwind 
determined to take the risk and commit to this new technology. In 2005, Goldwind had the 
prototype of the 1.2 MW turbine and installed it in Da Ban City wind farm for pilot operation. 
That became the first wind turbine produced in China over 1 MW.  
Further, Goldwind also acquired the license for that 1.5 MW turbine with a larger 64 meter 
diameter rotor, when integrating knowledge from Vensys to R&D teams in China (Lewis, 
2012). Based on this, Goldwind improved its magnetic electric direct-drive technology to 
produce 1.5MW turbines in 2007. After its acquisition of Vensys in 2008, Goldwind had 
already commercialized the products of the 2.5 MW (2009) and 3.0 MW (2009) turbines, 
through internalizing Vensys’ R&D competences. In summarizing key factors for the success 
of Goldwind, former CEO Wu Gang emphasized that “insisting on collaborative research, 
rather than licensing technology or purchasing turbine design solutions made Goldwind 
strong at independent technology development” (interview, 2010). After acquiring Vensys by 
70% in 2008, the registered patents for Goldwind increased from 3 in 2007 to over 170 in 
2012 (Zhou et al., 2015). 
Goldwind then established a joint venture with Vensys for developing 1.5MW and 2.5MW 
direct drive wind turbines, which made up around 20% of the total production capacity in 
2012. These wind turbine models are estimated to dominate the majority of the wind market 
in China for the next 3 to 5 years, according to expert views. After executing its 
internationalization strategy, Goldwind is developing key products for the future, including 
wind turbines in the size of 6.0MW to 10MW for offshore use. 
In addition, Goldwind and Vensys are conducting joint R&D on amending turbines for the 
local conditions in China. This requires turbines that are suitable for low wind speed areas 
and extreme conditions such as desert conditions involving high heat, extreme dry weather 
and extreme sand exposure (e.g. in Gobi desert) and high altitude (e.g. for the Tibetan 
plateau). 
Figure 1 below shows how German wind energy firms, most importantly the wind design firm 
Vensys, contributed to the success of Goldwind through technology cooperation.  
Figure 1: Goldwind’s technology cooperation with German firms Jacobs, REpower and 
Vensys. Amended from Lewis (2013)  
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Table 5 provides an analysis how the Vensys – Goldwind technology cooperation is 
characterised by several factors that challenge the North-South technology cooperation 
paradigm.  
Table 5: Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-North technology cooperation: Evidence from 
Vensys - Goldwind 
Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-
North technology cooperation 
Evidence from Vensys - Goldwind 
South-North flow of capital Capital flow from Goldwind to Vensys in the 
form of a joint venture / acquisition 
South-North drivers for market access Chinese market access driven by Goldwind 
South-North joint R&D / R&D leadership Technologies are jointly being amended by 
Goldwind and Vensys: PMDD turbines, 
larger turbines, amendments for extreme 
conditions 
South-North origins of innovation such as 
patents and other forms of IPRs 
No clear evidence found 
 
4.1.2 Technology cooperation in China: Fuhrländer, Aerodyn – Sinovel, Guodian 
United Power and Mingyang 
While Goldwind is China’s largest wind energy firm and its most successful firm due to its 
advanced technology, other wind energy firms’ technology also emerged thanks to 
technology transfer and technology cooperation with European firms, most notably German 
firms. Most importantly, these firms include leading firms Sinovel, Guodian United Power, 
Mingyang.  
Sinovel - Fuhrländer 
Sinovel is one of China’s leading wind energy firms, currently ranking second after Goldwind, 
with an estimated market share of about 17% and an installed generation capacity of about  
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3000 MW (Li et al., 2013). Sinovel was the largest wind turbine manufacturer in China since 
2008 until Goldwind took the lead in 2011/12. Sinovel has had a turbulent firm history, which 
for years was troubled by trade disputes with the Austria-American firm AMSC (American 
Superconductor Corporation) over IP theft related to stolen source codes and software for 
upgrading Sinovel’s turbines to meet Chinese grid requirements (Lewis, 2013). Sinovel also 
cooperated with European wind energy firm Fuhrländer, which licenced technology to 
Sinovel. It uses gear-driven wind energy technology, mainly in the medium-size turbine 
segment, originating mainly from Fuhrländer 
Fuhrländer was a German wind turbine manufacturer that has been manufacturing wind 
turbines since the 1980s and was based in the Westerwald region of Germany. In 2012, it 
had to file for bankruptcy and stopped business operations in 2013. It sold gear-driven 
turbines in the medium-size segment. Fuhrländer sold licences to many Chinese wind 
energy firms, including leading wind firm Sinovel (see table 2 for details). However, unlike 
Vensys and Aerodyn it did not establish any joint ventures or conducted joint development 
with Chinese wind firms. Fuhrländer sold also licences to other countries, including to Japan 
and several European countries. 
Guodian United Power  - Aerodyn 
Guodian United Power is one of China’s leading wind energy firms, with a market share of 
about 16% and an installed generation capacity of about 2850 MW (Li et al., 2013). It 
belongs to one of the five big utility firms, China Guodian Corporation, that dominates the 
energy sector in China. It is a state-owned enterprise. It came into the wind energy sector 
with plenty of expertise in energy generation, transmission and distribution, but little 
expertise in wind energy manufacturing and wind turbine innovation. United Power therefore 
licenced European wind firm Aerodyn for getting access to modern wind turbine technology 
through technology transfer and cooperation agreements. It uses gear-driven turbines, 
mainly in the medium-size turbine segment, like Aerodyn.  
Aerodyn is a German wind turbine manufacturer that has been operating since 1983 and is 
based in Rendsburg in Northern Germany. While they started operating in Germany only in 
the beginning, they are now selling their technology licences to the international market. 
Today Aerodyn’s wind turbines and their components (such as rotor blades) are being sold 
and installed on all five continents, both onshore and offshore. It sells gear-driven turbines of 
up to 2.5 MW capacity (Aerodyn, 2014). Aerodyn provides licences to China’s leading wind 
firm United Power and is conducting joint development with Mingyang. It also has technology 
cooperations with at least another 5 Chinese wind energy firms – see table 1 for details. 
Mingyang - Aerodyn 
Mingyang is one of China’s leading wind energy firms, with a market share of about 7% and 
an installed generation capacity of about 1200 MW (Li et al., 2013). It has emerged in recent 
years and has only existed for about 8 years. It is the only non-state owned wind energy firm 
that is in China’s top five wind manufacturers. Mingyang has joint technology development 
with European wind firm Aerodyn. It uses gear-driven wind energy technology, mainly in the 
medium-size turbine segment, like Aerodyn.  
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Table 6 provides an analysis how the technology cooperation between Fuhrländer, Aerodyn 
– Sinovel, Guodian United Power and Mingyang is characterised by several factors that 
challenge the North-South technology cooperation paradigm. 
Table 6: Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-North technology cooperation: Evidence from 
Fuhrländer, Aerodyn – Sinovel, Guodian United Power and Mingyang 
Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-
North technology cooperation 
Evidence from Fuhrländer, Aerodyn – 
Sinovel, Guodian United Power and 
Mingyang 
South-North flow of capital Capital flow from Chinese firms to European 
firms in the form of licencing and joint 
development 
South-North drivers for market access Moderate market access to China  
South-North joint R&D / R&D leadership Technologies are jointly being amended by 
Mingyang and Aerodyn: gear-driven turbines, 
multi-megawatt turbines 
South-North origins of innovation such as 
patents and other forms of IPRs 
No clear evidence found 
 
As this analysis shows the four leading Chinese wind energy firms rely on technology 
acquired through various forms of technology transfer and technology cooperation from 
European, wind firms, mostly from Germany. Most common technology cooperation 
mechanisms are licensing and joint ventures. The access to these Sino-European 
technology cooperations without doubt contributed significantly to the emergence of the 
Chinese wind energy technology and industry. 
 
4.3 Case study India 
 
Table 7 indicates the relationship between Indian wind energy firms and European wind 
energy firms with regards to different models of technology transfer and technology 
cooperation. In comparison to the Chinese case, Indian wind firms such as Suzlon have 
relied more on mergers and acquisitions, purchasing R&D departments and developing joint 
ventures rather than going down the licencing route. This meant more innovation originated 
from India and a reliance on licencing foreign technology was lower than for China. 
Table 7: The relationship between Indian and European wind energy firms with regards to 
different models of technology transfer and technology cooperation.  
Indian company Model of technology 
transfer / cooperation 
European source firm 
Suzlon License  Südwind 
Suzlon Acquisition Südwind R&D 
Suzlon Joint Venture AE Rotor Techniek Company 
Suzlon Acquisition REpower 
ReGen PowerTech License Vensys 
RRB Joint Venture Vestas 
Enercon India (Later Joint Venture / Subsidiary Enercon 
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WindWorld India) 
Pioneer Joint Venture Gamesa 
This paper focuses specifically on two case studies: 1. market leader Suzlon and its 
relationship to REpower, 2. other leading firms: Enercon – WindWorld India, Vensys – 
ReGen. 
 
4.3.1 Technology cooperation in Europe: REpower – Suzlon 
Suzlon 
Indian market leader Suzlon was founded in 1995, diversifying from a family-run textile 
business. Its owners and managers, Tanti family, gained valuable experience about wind 
energy technology whilst installing two wind turbines to power their textile business. Suzlon 
entered the Indian wind energy sector by selling turbines manufactured by its licensor, 
German wind energy firm Südwind. In 1997, Südwind filed for bankruptcy. Suzlon took this 
opportunity to build its own technical and manufacturing capabilities by acquiring parts of 
Südwind’s R&D division and hiring its employees. Suzlon thus set up its own R&D facilities 
in Rostock, Germany (Narain et al., 2014). 
Since 1997-98, Suzlon has been manufacturing and developing new wind turbines for the 
Indian market. In 2001, Suzlon established a rotor blades research facility in the Netherlands 
with AE Rotor Techniek Company along with forming strategic alliances with Dutch 
researchers and collaborations with Enron Wind Rotor Production and Aerpac B.V. From 
2002-2005 Suzlon set up research and representative offices in the USA, China and 
Germany, expanding both their research endeavours and target markets.  Suzlon’s core 
business model was the full vertical integration of all wind-related activities, as figure 3 
indicates.Thus, to reduce cost of production and improve their competitiveness in the 
international market, Suzlon acquired new resources to achieve full integration of the wind 
technology services. This gave Suzlon the advantage to not only manufacture wind towers, 
but also use expertise from different countries for various parts of the wind turbine value 
chain – aerodynamic parts from the Netherlands, generators from Austria, turbines from 
Germany, and information and software technology from India (Narain et al., 2014). 
Hence, through technology transfer licensing and developing subsidiaries across the globe, 
Suzlon established itself as leading company in wind energy technology solutions. By 2009, 
Suzlon had installed 4,400 MW of wind energy capacity in eight states across India. It is 
estimated that over the period of 2004-2009, Suzlon’s cumulative installed base grew by 
400%. Globally Suzlon has reported having an installed over 15,000 MW of wind energy 
(Narain et al., 2014).  
Suzlon acquired German wind energy firm REpower in 2007 to gain access to the German 
market. This has contributed to the internationalization of the German wind energy market, 
with Indian firms (as well as Chinese) entering the market via acquisitions and mergers and 
contributing to its strategic and technological development. 
Figure 2 shows how European wind energy firms contributed to the establishment of Suzlon 
through technology cooperation. The figure also shows how Suzlon purchased German wind 
firms, including REpower which did not contribute to the establishment of Suzlon or its 
technology, but opened the doors for the European wind market (hence the inverted arrow). 
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Figure 2: Suzlon’s technology cooperation with European firms and its take-over of 
REpower.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows Suzlon’s international business model. 
 
Figure 3: Suzlon’s business model. Source: Narain et al., 2014. 
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REpower  
REpower started as a German small and medium enterprise (SME) and has been active in 
the wind energy industry since 1980 through its predecessor. REpower in its present form 
exists since 2001. REpower focuses both on onshore and offshore wind energy. REpower’s 
6 MW offshore was until 2014 the largest offshore turbine in the world, it was then overtaken 
by Vestas 8 MW turbine. Its business model is characterised by being a quality turbine 
producer, which has powerful turbines and emphasises reliability of turbines, service and 
maintenance. REpower operates turbines with gears. Most of its components come from 
suppliers, however REpower develops its own rotor blades. The company has German 
suppliers (e.g. Siemens), European suppliers and Asian suppliers, which it intends to expand 
in the future. Since 2007, the Indian wind firm Suzlon has taken over 100% of REpower, this 
process was fully finalised in late 2012. Nevertheless REpower is independent as there is no 
profit transfer; Suzlon does not have access to REpower’s technology nor its IPRs, but 
Suzlon has access to some of REpower’s components and access to the German market 
(Urban and Nordensvärd, 2012; Lema et al., 2013).  
Table 8 provides an analysis how the REpower - Suzlon technology cooperation is 
characterised by several factors that challenge the North-South technology cooperation 
paradigm. 
Table 8: Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-North technology cooperation: Evidence from 
REpower - Suzlon 
Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-
North technology cooperation 
Evidence from REpower - Suzlon 
South-North flow of capital Capital flow from Suzlon to REpower in the 
form of an acquisition 
South-North drivers for market access European market access driven by Suzlon 
through REpower 
South-North joint R&D / R&D leadership No clear joint R&D strategies reported, 
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such as jointly amending technologies although Suzlon had joint R&D with other 
European firms before its acquisition of 
REpower 
South-North origins of innovation such as 
patents and other forms of IPRs 
No clear evidence found 
 
4.3.2 Technology cooperation in India: Enercon – Wind World India, Vensys – ReGen 
and others 
 
Enercon – Wind World India 
Enercon is a German wind turbine manufacturing firm founded in 1984. Enercon began with 
manufacturing small gearbox turbines, but shifted to gearless turbines in 1992. Enercon 
today has installed over 18,000 turbines worldwide. Enercon is Germany’s most important 
and most established wind energy firm, which has a market share of over 60% and has been 
operating for over 25 years. The firm is well known for being the innovator that developed 
the Direct Drive, a gearless technology. The advantage of the Direct Drive is that it is more 
efficient and has better reliability over the entire lifetime of a wind turbine compared to gears, 
but the service and maintenance is more complicated compared to gears. The 
disadvantages are its higher costs in comparison to gear-driven turbines. Enercon uses an 
electromagnetic Direct Drive. The company is the most prolific member of the Germany wind 
energy industry; it is also largely shaped by its charismatic founder Aloys Wobben. Some 
describe Enercon as a “hidden champion” since it offers an “innovative product, exceptional 
service, strong internationalization and, as a result, a high rate of growth” (Orth, 2008:12). 
The innovation of Enercon is based both on its innovation in wind energy technology and its 
innovative and very specialised business model (Urban and Nordensvärd, 2012). 
Enercon entered the Indian wind energy market in 1994 by establishing a subsidiary 
company in India. Enercon has had some success in India over the past decade and half 
with wind farms in seven high wind potential states – Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, 
Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. In total, Enercon India has 
installed 2,900 MW of wind energy in India.   
Enercon’s endeavor to prosper on the Indian market has been problematic in the long-run. 
Its business in India has been in a decline in recent years. “The Indian subsidiary of the 
German firm Enercon has lost a significant market share over the last few years (2003: 24%, 
2008: less than 8.5%)” (Walz and Delgado, 2012:101). In March 2011, the German parent 
company, Enercon Gmbh reported a dispute with its local Indian partner due to intellectual 
property rights (IPR) infringements and licensing problems. There are claims that the Indian 
subsidiary and its patents have been lost. In 2013, the minority owners, Enercon India, 
rebranded the local joint venture as Wind World India Ltd. and continue to operate under this 
name with Enercon’s technology.  
 
ReGen – Vensys 
ReGen Powertech entered the Indian market in 2006 and has become one of the fastest 
growing companies in a slow-growth economy. Currently it has the third largest share of the 
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Indian market and the largest share in the independent power provider market. Its key 
offering to the market is a gear-less 1.5 MW PMDD turbine. It has a technology cooperation 
through licencing with Vensys, Germany, almost making it the Indian arm of the Chinese 
manufacturer, Goldwind (Goldwind acquired Vensys in 2008) (Narain et al., 2014). It uses 
wind turbines designed for low wind speed areas based on licencing technology from 
German firm Vensys.  
ReGen Powertech has thus far installed near 400 MW of wind energy in India, primarily for 
corporate customers including steel companies, textile manufacturers and mills and 
developers such as India Energy and Tata Power. As the Indian policies moves to support 
quality of turbines over installations (via generation based incentives), ReGen hopes to gain 
more market share as they argue the Direct Drive turbine is a better long term investment 
with decreased maintenance requirements.  
RRB – Vestas 
Starting as an acquisition of Danish wind firm Vestas, RRB Energy Limited manufactures 
and supplies wind turbines for harnessing power from wind in India. It produces blades and 
microprocessor based on wind turbine controllers. The company also operates as an 
independent power producer of wind power. In addition, it offers solutions in the area of 
harnessing wind energy for power generation, which include site selection, micrositing, 
preparation of detailed project report, project engineering erection, commissioning, and after 
sales service of wind power projects. The company was formerly known as Vestas RRB 
India Limited and changed its name to RRB Energy Limited in January 2008 after further 
acquisitions. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is based in Chennai, India. RRB 
Energy Limited operates as a subsidiary of Eco RRB Infra Private Limited (Narain et al., 
2014). 
As this analysis shows some Indian wind energy firms rely on technology transfer and 
technology cooperation with European wind firms, mostly joint ventures and some licencing. 
However, India’s market leader Suzlon relied much more on its own innovations and on 
mergers and acquisitions than its Chinese counterparts. 
Table 9 provides an analysis how the technology cooperation between Enercon – Wind 
World India, Vensys – ReGen and others is characterised by several factors that challenge 
the North-South technology cooperation paradigm. 
Table 9: Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-North technology cooperation: Evidence from 
Enercon –Wind World India, Vensys – ReGen and others 
Factors characterising ‘reverse’ South-
North technology cooperation 
Evidence from Enercon – Wind World 
India, Vensys – ReGen and others 
South-North flow of capital Capital flow from Indian firms to European 
firms in the form of licencing and joint 
ventures, although for Enercon a North-
South flow of capital has been observed 
South-North drivers for market access Moderate market access to India 
South-North joint R&D / R&D leadership Technologies are jointly being amended by 
ReGen and Vensys: PMDD turbines; RRB 
and Vestas: gear-driven turbines; Pioneer 
and Gamesa: gear-driven turbines; 
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Enercon’s Indian subsidiary Wind World is 
now developing its own technology based on 
Enercon’s direct drive technology 
South-North origins of innovation such as 
patents and other forms of IPRs 
No clear evidence found 
 
5 Discussion 
 
5.1 The implications for national innovation paths and the internationalization of wind 
markets and technologies 
The analysis above revealed that the technology of leading wind energy firms in China and 
India, such as Goldwind, Sinovel, Mingyan, United Power as well as Suzlon, Windworld India 
and ReGen is linked to international technology cooperation with European wind firms in one 
way or the other. This has traditionally been the case with regards to technology transfer, 
particularly in China, while more recent technology cooperations include joint ventures and 
acquisitions. It is striking that German firms are particularly strongly engaged in technology 
cooperation with Asian wind firms. This has two main implications:  
First, Asian innovation paths in wind energy, particularly in China, have to some extent 
evolved based on the technology they acquired from their European technology cooperation 
partners. Wind energy technology from Europe has therefore helped shape Chinese wind 
energy technology and innovation paths and more recently also partly India’s wind energy 
technology. Goldwind’s wind energy technology is characterised by the gear-less PMDD and 
the up-scaling of turbines which originated from Vensys and which are now being developed 
as joint cooperations. Windworld India operates with advanced Direct Drive technology from 
Enercon, ReGen does the same with licences from Vensys. At the same time Sinovel’s 
technology depended on licensing from Fuhrländer, United Power’s technology depended 
on licencing from Aerodyn and Mingyang’s technology depended on joint development with 
Aerodyn. The striking outlier is Suzlon. In its beginnings, Suzlon aimed to develop 
technology domestically, partly through the Südwind license from Germany. However, its 
rise as market leader was because of its various acquisitions across leading wind energy 
firms and actors. By following the acquisition model, it not only gained technology and 
expertise, but also access to bigger and more advanced markets. Today Suzlon is a global 
business that operates world-wide, in emerging markets as well as in established markets 
such as North America. Suzlon acquired German wind energy firm REpower not because it 
needed access to advanced technology, but because it needed a reliable, reputable 
European brand for access to the European market. As such the acquisition of REpower by 
Suzlon is fundamentally different to the acquisition of Vensys by Goldwind. Unlike with 
Vensys-Goldwind, Suzlon does not have access to REpower’s full technology nor its IPRs, 
but Suzlon has access to some of REpower’s components and access to the German 
market in which it operates as the European brand REpower. These findings suggests that 
the supply strategies in Northern and Southern markets have shifted to some extent, with 
Indian and Chinese suppliers opening up wind energy markets in Europe and contributing to 
the internationalization of global wind markets. 
Secondly, the entry of Asian wind energy firms into European markets as well as the entry of 
European wind technology in Asian markets has led to an internationalization of global wind 
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energy markets and technologies. Our interviews reveal that large Asian wind energy firms 
such as Goldwind offer opportunities for profits, employment and economic growth for 
smaller wind design firms such as Vensys. Thanks to Goldwind, Vensys now has access to 
the world’s largest wind energy market in comparison to before operating at very limited 
scales without long-term profitability and strong business partners. Suzlon’s acquisition of 
REpower has further contributed to the internationalization of the European wind energy 
market. These new technology cooperations between Asia and Europe contribute to making 
wind energy markets and technologies global rather than national or regional and further 
breaking down the boundaries between markets and national/firm-level technologies. This 
has implications for the nature of international technology cooperation as we will discuss 
below.  
 
5.2 The implications for the nature of international technology cooperation: from 
North-South technology transfer to South-North technology cooperation? 
Different types of international technology cooperation, such as technology transfer through 
FDI and ODA, licencing, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions are an important strategy 
for developing the wind energy industry as a late-comer.  
Going back to the conceptual framework, we conclude the following: 1. Our research found 
that the capital for the technology cooperation has in some cases come from China 
(Goldwind) and India (Suzlon) to the benefit of European firms, thereby influencing 
ownership of the firm and strategic decisions related to R&D, technology choices, market 
access, investments, employments etc (Vensys and REpower). 2. Our research concluded 
that overseas market access for European wind firms is driven by wind firms from China, 
thereby opening up access to the huge Chinese market (e.g. Vensys-Goldwind). The same 
did not apply to India as wind technologies in Europe and India are being marketed as 
separate brands (e.g. Suzlon-REpower). 3. We also found that technologies are jointly being 
amended between firms from emerging economies and high income countries, potentially 
leading to innovative designs and technologies that are more appropriate for new markets 
such as low-wind speed turbines, high altitude and desert condition turbines etc (Vensys-
Goldwind, to some extent Indian and other Chinese firms); 4. Our research found little 
evidence that suggests that the origins of innovation, such as patents, come increasingly 
from emerging economies in technology cooperation deals between the EU and emerging 
economies. Patent data analysis reveals a mixed picture indicating that China and India are 
slowly catching up though (Zhou et al, 2015). In line with these findings, our research found 
that joint R&D, particularly for amended technologies, happens between Chinese, Indian and 
European firms, but the ownership of the IPRs seems to be predominantly resting with 
European firms. This requires close observation and future research over the coming years 
and decades when this balance might change.  
We found that there are distinct differences between China and India with regards to the 
wind energy industry. India has a very successful domestic wind energy industry driven by 
the domestic efforts of Suzlon, which only acquired parts of foreign firms, such as R&D 
departments. It is only very recently that EU firms such as REpower, Enercon and Vensys 
began making a more significant contribution to India’s technology and innovation paths. 
China on the other hand has mainly relied on technology transfer in the early beginning of its 
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wind energy sector. More recently it has gained access to advanced wind energy technology 
through joint ventures, the acquisition of entire foreign firms and the licencing of foreign 
technology. Fast technological catch up has therefore happened in the case of China which 
has speeded through the early stages of the technological development of wind energy 
technology. Today, China uses advanced wind energy innovation, such as the permanent 
magnetic Direct Drive and multi-megawatt turbines, including for the offshore market. This 
has not happened until recently in India due to its long-standing domestic industry which is 
based to a large extent on Suzlon’s Indian-based experiences.  
The implication of China’s and India’s catch up is that these two countries are the new global 
leaders in wind energy, in terms of market shares and investments, while they are slowly 
catching up in terms of innovation capabilities. Goldwind (as well as other Chinese firms) 
and Suzlon are today key rivals to the old established EU players like Vestas and Enercon. 
This opens up opportunities for cooperation between the EU and emerging economies, such 
as the acquisition of Vensys by Goldwind and REpower by Suzlon. However it also leads to 
challenges and concerns in relation to competition such as the ability of Chinese turbine 
manufacturers to compete in European markets with European-based technology at lower 
costs. Fuhrländer’s bankruptcy shows that in an increasingly competitive and 
internationalised market, licencing wind energy technology may not be sufficiently profitable, 
while joint ventures and acquisitions may offer more stable financial futures in some cases 
(see e.g. Vensys - Goldwind and REpower –Suzlon). This also means that the ‘new’ Asian 
leaders in wind energy contribute to the internationalization of EU wind energy markets and 
technology, for example by acquisitions. In addition, this means that Asian wind firms tend to 
bring new capital to financially less stable European wind firms, whereas the innovation 
capabilities remain largely with the European counterparts. This new form of South-North 
technology cooperation could distort the decade-long power balance between Europe and 
Asia in the wind energy sector.  
As three of the four factors that characterise South-North technology cooperation have been 
observed  we see an emerging pattern that may challenge the dominance of the classical 
North-South technology cooperation paradigm in the long-term. It is no longer the global 
North that solely dominates global wind energy markets through flows of capital, drivers for 
market access and R&D leadership. As the tables begin to turn it is increasingly the global 
South that dominates global wind energy markets through flows of capital, drivers for market 
access and R&D leadership. It is the Asian wind energy firms today that turn towards 
European wind energy firms to invest in joint ventures and to acquire entire wind energy 
firms. Faced with the global financial crisis, increasing unemployment and threats of 
bankruptcy among renewable energy firms (e.g. wind energy firm Fuhrländer and many solar 
energy firms), many European wind energy firms cannot turn away the offer of technology 
cooperation from their Asian counterparts. The power constellations and the financial 
potency of Europe versus Asia have begun to shift in the global wind energy market.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper explored how technology transfer and technology cooperation from the EU 
shaped specific firm-level wind energy technologies that influenced the national innovation 
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paths in China and India. The paper also discussed how the cooperation between China, 
India and the EU evolved over time moving from technology transfer from European firms to 
Asian firms to newer forms of technology cooperation. This research concludes that in the 
past, technology transfer and technology cooperation from the EU played a major role in 
influencing the design and direction of  leading firm-level wind energy technologies in China 
(Goldwind, Sinovel, Guodian United Power, Mingyang), and more recently also India 
(Windworld India and ReGen). While this paper mentioned technological capabilities on the 
margins, the main focus of the paper was to analyse how different types of technology 
cooperation between the EU and China/India, such as licencing, joint ventures, mergers and 
acquisitions, led to the development of specific firm-level wind energy technologies by 
Chinese and Indian lead firms. The cutting-edge wind energy technologies we currently see 
in China and India are similar to those of lead firms in Europe, for example multi-megawatt 
turbines for on- and offshore use and turbines with Direct Drive. This echoes the cutting-
edge technology of firms such as Vensys and Enercon. In China we also see gear-based 
wind technology that is derived from licenced technology from Fuhrländer and Aerodyn. To 
link this back to the innovation literature of Hu (1992), Porter (1990), Patel (1995) and 
Ohmae, these findings challenge the common understanding of national systems of 
innovation as wind firms and markets become increasingly globalized and internationalized. 
The paper further discussed different strategies that China and India used for achieving fast 
technological catch up in the wind energy sector. China has historically depended on 
technology transfer to build up its wind energy industry, whereas India has developed more 
independently thanks to strong local innovation at Suzlon, although in recent years foreign 
licenses from Enercon and Vensys have been of importance. More recently, other forms of 
technology cooperation, such as joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions play a role for 
fast technological catch up for China, and increasingly also for India. Nevertheless recently it 
was important for India’s leading firm Suzlon to acquire European firm REpower for access 
to European markets, rather than for access to their technology. 
This research found that three of the four factors that characterise South-North technology 
cooperation have been observed (South-North flows of capital, South-North drivers for 
market access, South-North joint R&D / R&D leadership, while South-North origins of 
innovation has been less observed). Zhou et al.’s (2015) patent analysis shows a mixed 
picture with indications that patents and SCI publications from leading Chinese and Indian 
wind firms are increasingly occurring, although still at a lower level compared to leading 
European wind firms (Zhou et al., 2015). Hence we see an emerging pattern that may 
challenge the dominance of the classical North-South technology cooperation paradigm in 
the long-term. While it is too early to speak of reverse technology cooperation, South-North 
technology cooperation between China, India and Europe may become a common practice 
amongst wind energy technology firms in the long-term. The move away from Asian firms 
being recipients of wind energy technology to more mature forms of technology cooperation 
(such as mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures) challenges the classical North-South 
technology cooperation paradigm and indicates complex forms of South-North technology 
cooperation. This also means that technology cooperation between emerging economies 
and high income countries in the global North has become more mutual and multi-facetted 
as the power and financial balances have shifted, while the innovative capabilities may be 
acquired through joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions.  
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A new strategy of becoming a global leader in wind energy technology has been proven, 
particularly by China. For the global low carbon economy this means that the strategy of 
South-North technology cooperation in the wind sector could be replicated by other 
emerging economies, such as Brazil which has international technology cooperation with 
Enercon and Vensys. Further research in this field is needed. 
This new knowledge adds to the body of literature on international technology transfer and 
technology cooperation. The paper looked beyond the classical North-South technology 
transfer paradigm and studied newly emerging forms of technology transfer and cooperation 
from the global South to the global North by using wind energy technology in China, India 
and the EU as case studies.   
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